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ABSTRACT
An important challenge in the field of law is the attribution of re-
sponsibility and blame to individuals and organisations for a given
harm. Attributing legal responsibility often involves (but is not lim-
ited to) assessing to what extent certain parties have caused harm,
or could have prevented harm from occurring. This paper presents
a causal framework for performing such assessments that is partic-
ularly suitable for the analysis of complex legal cases, where the
actions of many parties have had a direct or indirect effect on the
harm that did occur. This framework is evaluated by means of a
case study that applies it to the Baby P. case, a high-profile case of
child abuse leading to the death of a child that has been the subject
of a number of public inquiries in the UK. The paper concludes
with a discussion of the framework, including a roadmap of future
work and barriers to adoption.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.4.2 [Information Systems Applications]: Types of systems—
decision support; J.1 [Computer Applications]: Administrative
Data Processing—Law; J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and
Behavioral Sciences—Psychology, Sociology
Keywords
Causality, Responsibility, Legal cases, Inquest, Enquiry, Quantita-
tive analysis of responsibility, Blame
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1. INTRODUCTION
Responsibility attribution is pervasive in many areas of human
interaction, including law, politics, business, sports, and everyday
social settings. Something goes wrong, and we seek to assign
blame to someone or some group. This is a challenging process:
there are often complex causal interactions between multiple agents
and events, and agents can have differing roles and varying degrees
of involvement. One needs to work out what happened, who did
what, why people acted as they did, and what would have happened
if they had acted differently (e.g. would the same results have been
obtained?).
The problem of responsibility attribution looms especially large
in the law. Legal responsibility is a complex concept that depends
on a variety of factors [30], including a person’s behaviour, the
lawfulness of this behaviour (e.g., did it break a duty or contract?),
whether the behaviour caused the harm at issue, and the reasons
for this behaviour. Causation is often a central question: Did the
defendant’s action cause or contribute to the result? Did the actions
of a third party intervene to cut the causal chain from the defen-
dant’s action to the final outcome? How did the two agents’ actions
combine to yield the result [22]?
Despite the key role of causation, the law lacks a comprehen-
sive theoretical or formal framework for causal analysis. The two
most common accounts, the “but-for” and NESS tests [35] struggle
to accommodate complex networks of interacting causes, overde-
termination and pre-emption, probabilistic causes, and foreseeabil-
ity [13, 33]. More recent legal accounts, for example [33], do cap-
ture some of these issues in an informal way, but without a frame-
work that permits formalization and objective assessment. The
causal framework presented in this paper seeks to address these is-
sues. It provides a formal account that extends the logic of but-for
causation to complex interacting networks of causes, solving prob-
lems of overdetermination and pre-emption, and capturing notions
of foreseeability and probabilistic causes. It relies on the exten-
sion of formal definitions of responsibility and blame, and supplies
a metric for assigning degrees of responsibility and blame – es-
pecially suitable for modelling complex situations with multiple
agents. Moreover, recent psychological studies suggest that peo-
ple’s intuitive responsibility judgements are modelled accurately
by the framework [15, 36, 28].
This rich formal framework permits causal analysis of complex
legal cases. It takes into account the various factors that need to be
proved legally, and thus allows for more principled assessment of
legal cases, as demonstrated by the case study in the paper.
2. DOMAINS OF APPLICATION
If an offence (either criminal or civil) is subject to any kind of
legal investigation, the ultimate objective of that investigation is to
attribute responsibility for the offence and to determine appropriate
punishment for the offender(s). For many offences there are mul-
tiple people and/or organisations that bear some degree of respon-
sibility, and the ultimate punishment is expected to take account of
this. For example:
1. In a criminal case involving the death of a child (such as the
well-known cases of Victoria Climbié [2] and Baby P. [21])
the trial may determine that the baby died as a result of being
struck by the father, while the mother deliberately failed to
report the incident to the authorities. Although both parents
bear responsibility for the death (it is assumed the child may
have survived if treated quickly) it is likely they will receive
different sentences to reflect the different levels of responsi-
bility.
2. An inquest or inquiry, following a case like 1, may result
in a much broader investigation. For example, in both of
the actual cases mentioned there, subsequent public inquiries
covered the actions of the social services department, local
health authority, police and specific individuals within those
organisations. Here, the objective is to attribute responsibil-
ity so that appropriate action can be taken. If an organisation
or individual is found to bear a “high responsibility” then fur-
ther charges and/or punishment may follow, while for lower
levels of responsibility it may be sufficient to make recom-
mendations for behaviour/policy change to prevent similar
problems occurring in the future.
3. Complex civil cases often involve a claimant suing multi-
ple parties. For example, there are numerous legal cases
where a victim of a work-related illness (e.g., lung cancer)
claims against several different employees (e.g., [1]; more
generally, see [33, 16]). Medical negligence also provides
complex cases with multiple agents involved in harm to the
claimant. If and when a final sum is agreed, the amount to
be paid by each party should be proportional to their level of
responsibility.
4. An enquiry such as that in 2 can lead to even further removed
levels of responsibility in subsequent cases. For example, af-
ter the doctor Harold Shipman was found guilty of murdering
multiple patients the subsequent inquiry attributed blame to
a large number of named medical professionals for failure to
understand and act on what was happening [3]. As a result of
this, there are now widespread reports of what is referred to
as the “Shipman effect” in cases involving “suspicious” pa-
tient deaths, whereby medical professionals may have been
over-zealous in reporting colleagues. This has led to poten-
tial miscarriages of justice for which those over-zealous re-
porters have some responsibility.
This paper focuses on such situations, with the objective of pro-
viding a formal framework to attribute responsibility fairly. The
framework complements other recent work in legal reasoning that
deals, for example, with causal explanatory Bayesian networks for
legal reasoning and probabilistic evaluation of evidence [12, 29,
34], and more generic models of legal argumentation [7]. That
work can be considered most relevant at (i) the evidence gathering
stage [11, 34] (for example, to help the Crown Prosecution Service
determine whether there is sufficient evidence for a likely convic-
tion) and (ii) in helping lawyers understand and present evidence.
However, the work in this paper is most obviously targeted at later
stages in the legal process (such as in both sentencing and inquests)
- specifically when there is less uncertainty about the evidence and
more of a focus on attributing responsibility.
3. CAUSALITY, RESPONSIBILITY,
BLAME, AND NORMALITY
In this section, we reviewHalpern and Pearl’s definitions of causal
models and causality [20], and Chockler and Halpern’s definitions
of responsibility and blame [8] and show how these definitions are
adapted to legal settings.
3.1 Causal models
Formally, a causal modelM is a tuple hS,Fi, where S is a set
of variables, associating with each variable the range of its val-
ues, and F is a set of functions defining the dependencies between
the variables. The set of variables is usually partitioned into two
subsets: the exogenous variables U , whose values are determined
by the factors outside the model, and the endogenous variables V ,
whose values are determined by the exogenous variables and the
functions F .
We can describe a causal modelM using a causal network, which
is, roughly speaking, a directed acyclic graph representing variables
and their dependencies. We call a setting ~u for the variables in U
a context. The equations determined by F = {FX : X 2 V} can
be thought of as representing processes (or mechanisms) by which
values are assigned to variables. For example, if FX(Y, Z, U) =
Y + U (which we usually write as X = Y + U ), then if Y = 3
and U = 2, thenX = 5, regardless of how Z is set.
While the equations for a given problem are typically obvious,
the choice of variables may not be. Consider the following example
(due to Hall [18]), showing that the choice of variables influences
the causal analysis. Suppose that Suzy and Billy both pick up rocks
and throw them at a bottle. Suzy’s rock gets there first, shattering
the bottle. Since both throws are perfectly accurate, Billy’s would
have shattered the bottle had Suzy not thrown. In this case, a naive
model might have an exogenous variable U that encapsulates what-
ever background factors cause Suzy and Billy to decide to throw the
rock (the details of U do not matter, since we are interested only in
the context whereU ’s value is such that both Suzy and Billy throw),
a variable ST for Suzy throws (ST = 1 if Suzy throws, and ST = 0
if she doesn’t), a variable BT for Billy throws, and a variable BS for
bottle shatters. In the naive model, whose graph is given in Figure 1
on the left,BS is 1 if one of ST and BT is 1. This causal model does
BS
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Figure 1: Models for the rock-throwing example.
not distinguish between Suzy and Billy’s rocks hitting the bottle si-
multaneously and Suzy’s rock hitting first. It also illustrates the
concept of overdetermination, mentioned in the introduction, with
the bottle shattering caused by both rocks.
A more sophisticated model might also include variables SH and
BH, for Suzy’s rock hits the bottle and Billy’s rock hits the bottle.
Clearly BS is 1 iff one of SH and BH is 1. However, now, SH is
1 if ST is 1, and BH = 1 if BT = 1 and SH = 0. Thus, Billy’s
throw hits if Billy throws and Suzy’s rock doesn’t hit, capturing
pre-emption of Billy’s rock by Suzy’s rock. This model is described
by the graph on the right in Figure 1, where we implicitly assume
a context where Suzy throws first, so there is an edge from SH to
BH, but not one in the other direction.1
Given a causal model M = (S,F), a (possibly empty) vector
~X of variables in V , and a vector ~x of values for the variables in
~X , we define a new causal model, denotedM ~X ~x, which is iden-
tical to M , except that the equation for the variables ~X in F is
replaced by ~X = ~x. Intuitively, this is the causal model that results
when the variables in ~X are set to ~x by some external action that af-
fects only the variables in ~X (and overrides the effects of the causal
equations). For example, ifM is the more sophisticated model for
the rock-throwing example, thenMST 0 is the model where Suzy
doesn’t throw.
A causal (propositional) formula ' is true or false in a causal
model, given a context. We write (M, ~u) |= ' if ' is true in causal
model M given context ~u. (M, ~u) |= [~Y  ~y](X = x) if the
variable X has value x in the unique (since we are dealing with
recursive models) solution to the equations inM~Y ~y in context ~u
(i.e., the unique vector of values for the exogenous variables that
simultaneously satisfies all equations F
~Y ~y
Z , Z 2 V   ~Y , with
the variables in U set to ~u). These definitions can be extended to
arbitrary causal formulas.
3.2 Causality
We now review the definition of causality by Halpern and Pearl [20].
DEFINITION 3.1. ~X = ~x is a cause of ' in (M, ~u) if the fol-
lowing three conditions hold:
AC1. (M, ~u) |= ( ~X = ~x) ^ '.
AC2. There exist a partition (~Z, ~W ) of V with ~X ✓ ~Z and some
setting (~x0, ~w) of the variables in ( ~X, ~W ) such that if (M, ~u) |=
Z = z⇤ for Z 2 ~Z, then
(a) (M, ~u) |= [ ~X  ~x0, ~W  ~w]¬'.
(b) (M, ~u) |= [ ~X  ~x, ~W 0  ~w, ~Z0  ~z⇤]' for all
subsets ~Z0 of ~Z \ ~X and all subsets ~W 0 of ~W , where
we abuse notation and write ~W 0  ~w to denote the as-
signment where the variables in ~W 0 get the same values
as they would in the assignment ~W  ~w, and similarly
for ~Z0  ~z⇤. That is, setting any subset ~W 0 of ~W to
the values in ~w should have no effect on ' as long as
~X has the value ~x, even if all the variables in an arbi-
trary subset of ~Z are set to their original values in the
context ~u.
AC3. ( ~X = ~x) is minimal; no subset of ~X satisfies AC2.
1Note that, strictly speaking, we do not need a separate variable for
SH , as in our equations, SH = ST , and therefore, we can just
use ST everywhere; we add it here to explicitly capture the order
of rocks hitting the bottle.
If ~X is a singleton, thenX = x is said to be a singleton cause of '
in (M, ~u).
Admittedly, the considerations that led to this definition are quite
subtle. The core of this definition lies in AC2. Informally, AC2(a)
is inspired by the traditional counterfactual reasoning, but it is more
permissive: it allows the dependence of ' on X to be tested under
special structural contingencies, in which the variables ~W are held
constant at some setting ~w. AC2(b) ensures that setting ~W to ~w (or
any subset of it) merely eliminates spurious side effects that tend
to mask the action of X . AC1 just says that A cannot be a cause
of B unless both A and B are true; and AC3 ensures minimality,
preventing the situation, where, for example, rock-throwing and
sneezing could be considered as a cause for the bottle shattering.
The requirement for AC2(b) to hold for all subsets ofW prevents
situations where W “conceals other causes for '”. The role of
this requirement is perhaps best understood by considering the fol-
lowing example, due to Hopkins and Pearl [25] (the description is
taken from [20]): Suppose that a prisoner dies either ifA loadsB’s
gun and B shoots, or if C loads and shoots his gun. Taking D to
represent the prisoner’s death and making the obvious assumptions
about the meaning of the variables, we have thatD = (A^B)_C.
Suppose that in the actual context u, A loads B’s gun, B does not
shoot, but C does load and shoot his gun, so that the prisoner dies.
That is, A = 1, B = 0, and C = 1. Clearly C = 1 is a cause of
D = 1. We would not want to say that A = 1 is a cause ofD = 1,
given thatB did not shoot (i.e., given thatB = 0). The key point is
that AC2(b) says that for A = 1 to be a cause ofD = 1, it must be
the case that D = 0 if only some of the values in ~W are set to ~w.
That means that the other variables get the same value as they do in
the actual context; in this case, by setting only A to 1 and leaving
B unset, B takes on its original value of 0, in which caseD = 0.
3.3 Responsibility and blame
The definitions of responsibility and blame below are by Chock-
ler and Halpern [8].
DEFINITION 3.2. The degree of responsibility of ~X = ~x for '
in (M, ~u), denoted dr((M, ~u), ( ~X = ~x),'), is 0 if ~X = ~x is not a
cause of ' in (M, ~u); it is 1/(k + 1) if ~X = ~x is a cause of ' in
(M, ~u) and there exists a partition (~Z, ~W ) and setting (~x0, ~w) for
which AC2 holds such that (a) k variables in ~W have different val-
ues in ~w than they do in the context ~u and (b) there is no partition
(~Z0, ~W 0) and setting (~x00, ~w0) satisfying AC2 such that only k0 < k
variables have different values in ~w0 than they do the context ~u.
Intuitively, dr((M, ~u), ( ~X = ~x),') measures the minimal num-
ber of changes that have to be made in ~u in order to make ' coun-
terfactually depend on ~X , provided the conditions on the subsets
of ~W and ~Z are satisfied. If there is no partition of V to (~Z, ~W )
that satisfies AC2, or ( ~X = ~x) does not satisfy AC3 for ' in
(M, ~u), then the minimal number of changes in ~u in Definition 3.2
is taken to have cardinality1, and thus the degree of responsibility
of ( ~X = ~x) is 0 (and hence it is not a cause). Clearly, the larger
the degree of responsibility is, the more influential is the cause on
the value of '.
EXAMPLE 3.3. Consider the following example. Suppose there
are 11 voters. Voter i is represented by a variableXi, i = 1, . . . , 11;
the outcome is represented by the variable O, which is 1 if Mr. B
wins and 0 if Mr. G wins. In the context where Mr. B wins 11–0,
it is easy to check that each voter is a cause of the victory (that is
Xi = 1 is a cause of O = 1, for i = 1, . . . , 11). However, the
degree of responsibility ofXi = 1 for isO = 1 is just 1/6, since at
least five other voters must change their votes before changing Xi
to 0 results in O = 0. But now consider the context where Mr. B
wins 6–5. Again, each voter who votes for Mr. B is a cause of him
winning. However, now each of these voters have degree of respon-
sibility 1. That is, if Xi = 1, changing Xi to 0 is already enough
to make O = 0; no other variables need to change.
The definition of blame addresses the situation where there is un-
certainty about the true situation or “how the world works”. Blame,
introduced in [8], considers the “true situation” to be determined
by the context, and “how the world works” to be determined by
the structural equations. An agent’s uncertainty is modeled by a
pair (K,Pr), where K is a set of pairs of the form (M, ~u), where
M is a causal model and ~u is a context, and Pr is a probability
distribution over K. A pair (M, ~u) is called a situation. We think
of K as describing the situations that the agent considers possible
before ~X is set to ~x. The degree of blame that setting ~X to ~x has
for ' is then the expected degree of responsibility of ~X = ~x for
' in (M ~X ~x, ~u), taken over the situations (M, ~u) 2 K. Note that
the situation (M ~X ~x, ~u) for (M, ~u) 2 K are those that the agent
considers possible after ~X is set to ~x.
DEFINITION 3.4. The degree of blame of setting ~X to ~x for '
relative to epistemic state (K,Pr), denoted db(K,Pr, ~X  ~x,'),
is X
(M,~u)2K
dr((M ~X ~x, ~u), ~X = ~x,') Pr((M, ~u)).
3.4 Defaults and normality
In this section we review the problem that arises from concepts
of defaults and normality and the ways to address it; the material
is largely taken from [19]. While the definitions of causality, re-
sponsibility, and blame provide clear and quantified measures of
causality and agree with our intuition in most cases, they only
check the existence of a contingency that creates a counterfactual
dependence; the “normality” of this contingency is never taken into
account. This can lead to surprising results, as illustrated by the fol-
lowing example, taken from [24] (see also [23]).
EXAMPLE 3.5. Assassin is in possession of a lethal poison, but
has a last-minute change of heart and refrains from putting it in
Victim’s coffee. Bodyguard puts antidote in the coffee, which would
have neutralized the poison had there been any. Victim drinks the
coffee and survives.
Out intuition says that Bodyguard’s putting the antidote in the Vic-
tim’s coffee is not a cause of the Victim being alive; however, ac-
cording to Def. 3.1, it is a cause, for there is a (not very likely)
contingency where Assasin attempts poisoning and the Victim sur-
vives iff there is an antidote in his coffee.
Ideally, we would like to only consider contingencies which change
the values of variables to more normal values, according to our un-
derstanding of how the world works. [19] suggests to extend the
causality framework by adding a ranking function that associates
with each possible world a rank, reflecting its “normality”. Then,
the only contingencies we are allowed to consider are those that
lower the current ranking of the world, that is, make it “more nor-
mal”. This definition reflects our intuition by removing unlikely
contingencies from consideration; under this definition, the anti-
dote in the coffee is not a cause of the victim being alive, since not
being poisoned is a more normal situation than being poisoned.
The ranking function can be combined with both the definition
of responsibility and the definition of blame in a straightforward
way. Since the responsibility is simply a quantitative measure of
causality, if there exists a contingency in a more probable world
that creates a causal dependence, the responsibility will measure
the size of this contingency, as in the original definition. For blame,
we can take into account only the more normal or more probable
worlds, or, alternatively, we can also consider the higher ranked
worlds, but attribute them a much lower probability.
4. CASE STUDY
Our main case study, on which we demonstrate our approach, is
the “Baby P.” case. We describe the case here, and construct the
causal model for it in Section 5.
“Baby P”, or Peter Connelly, was a baby who was born (March
2006), lived and died (August 2007) in the London borough of
Haringey after suffering physical abuse over a sustained period of
time. The circumstances leading up to baby Peter’s death are par-
ticularly perplexing because (i) Baby Peter was listed in the Child
Protection Register due to “physical abuse and neglect” and (ii)
he and his carers were being actively monitored by a system of
“joined-up governance” involving determinedly collaborating pro-
fessionals and organisations who were all aware of (i) [31].
Baby Peter suffered the abuse while living in a home with three
adults able to care for him: Peter’s mother Tracey Connelly, Pe-
ter’s stepfather Steven Barker and Steven Barker’s brother Jason
Owen. After Peter’s death, all three denied abusing Peter or having
witnessed any abuse. As a jury concluded, based on the available
evidence, that at least one of the adults in the household injured Pe-
ter but was unable to identify which one, none were found guilty of
murder or manslaughter, but all three were found guilty of “causing
or allowing [Peter’s] death” [32]. In other words, the Court decided
that each of the three adults are equally responsible for the death of
Peter and that each was in a position to have been able to prevent
his death. It is worth noting that, in sentencing, the judge takes into
account a number of factors, other than the degree of responsibility,
such as mitigating circumstances, prior/related convictions and the
extent to which each individual is a risk to the public.
Baby Peter was seen regularly by medical professionals, social
workers and other professionals involved in his case. On a num-
ber of occasions, these professionals and their associated organisa-
tions had opportunities to remove Peter from the care of the people
that caused or allowed the abuse to take place. Less than two days
before his death, Peter was seen by a locum consultant2 paediatri-
cian at a “child development clinic”, where Peter was referred as
part of registration on the Child Protection Register. An autopsy
performed after Peter’s death revealed that Peter would have had
a broken back and several other severe non-accidental injuries at
this time. However, the doctor failed to perform a full examination
because Peter was “miserable and cranky”. Had she done so, the
injuries would normally have been observed and Peter would have
had to be admitted to hospital. A subsequent review by England’s
health and social care regulator, the Care Quality Commission, crit-
icised the hospital where the doctor worked for “poor recruitment
practices”, “lack of specific training in child protection”, “short-
ages of staff” and “failings in governance” [9], and this may have
adversely affected the ability of the consultant paediatrician on duty
to make sound decisions in this case.
On two occasions, once in December 2006 and once in June/July
2007, Peter was assessed at A&E3. On both occasions, (i) med-
ical staff observed a range of injuries incurred at different times
that appeared to be non-accidental, (ii) Peter was diagnosed not to
2A consultant working on a short term contract.
3The Accident and Emergency department of a UK hospital.
suffer a medical condition that would cause him to bruise easily,
(iii) the medical examinations was followed by a police investi-
gation, with input from social services, and (iv) Tracey Connelly
was unable to provide a satisfactory explanation for what may have
caused Peter’s injuries. Following the December 2006 investiga-
tion, Haringey Legal Services (HLS) decide that the “threshold to
initiate care proceedings”, which could lead to a care order remov-
ing Peter from the care of his mother permanently, was met. In
spite of this, Haringey’s Children and Young People’s Service de-
cide not to proceed, but these proceedings did lead to Peter being
listed on the Child Protection Register. Following the June/July
2007 investigation, HLS decided that the threshold to initiate care
proceedings was not met. The police reported its findings to the
Crown Prosecution Service, who found that there was insufficient
evidence to pursue with a prosecution of Peter’s carers.
The decisions made by Haringey Legal Services and the Crown
Prosecution Service in determining whether to proceed with care
proceedings or a prosecution of Peter’s carers has been affected by
the evidence provided by social workers and police, their review
of the evidence and their policy/procedures to determine whether
to proceed with an application for care order or a prosecution. Al-
though he had been identified to police and social workers as an
unnamed friend of Tracey Connelly, it was not until the investi-
gation into Peter’s death that Steven Barker’s role as stepfather of
Peter and cohabitant of Tracey Connelly was revealed. As a result,
police investigators and social workers were confronted with con-
flicting evidence: on the one hand medical experts report that Peter
must have sustained non-accidental injuries over a period of time,
and on the other hand social workers observed that Peter appeared
to have a good relationship with his mother who was, so police in-
vestigators and social workers believed at the time, his sole carer.
But Tracey Connelly hid the identity and role of Steven Barker from
police investigators and social workers and could have been chal-
lenged more robustly to explain the conflicting evidence [21]. Al-
though Steven Barker had no prior convictions before the death of
Peter, he was known to police to have a history of violence [14]. As
such, one can argue that a more in-depth investigation by police, a
greater willingness to question Tracey Connelly by social workers
or a more robust review of the evidence by the legal services might
have revealed information that could have lead to the start of legal
proceedings.
5. MODELLINGTHEBABYP. CASE INTHE
CAUSALITY FRAMEWORK
In this section we discuss ways to capture the Baby P. case as a
causal model. This representation allows us to derive quantitative
measures of responsibility and blame for involved parties. We start
with the simplest model and gradually add more information to it,
that allows us to compute the degree of responsibility and blame of
the involved parties. The quantitative assessments that we compute
here are, of course, just rough estimates for illustrative purposes. In
fact, these details are exactly the type of thing that an inquiry could
debate and perhaps gather evidence for. The process of gradual
refinement of the model matches the process of collecting evidence,
and we expect that this is the way the causal modelling will be used
during the inquiry stage.
5.1 The simplest model – responsibility and
blame of the adults in Baby P.’s household
Our first attempt is a simple causal model M1 informally de-
picted in Fig. 2. This model focusses on the adults living in the
same household with Baby P. The variables of this model are listed
Variable Meaning Value
PD Baby Peter dies 1
TC Tracey Connelly caused the death of
Baby Peter
?
SC Steven Barker caused the death of Baby
Peter
?
JC Jason Owen caused the death of Baby Pe-
ter
?
TA Tracey Connelly allowed the death of
Baby Peter
?
SA Steven Barker allowed the death of Baby
Peter
?
JA Jason Owen allowed the death of Baby
Peter
?
PMC Baby Peter is allowed to be in the care of
his mother at the time of his death
1
Table 1: Variables of the modelM1 and known values
in Table 1.
PD
TC SC JC PMCTA SA JA
Figure 2: The simplest causal modelM1 for the Baby P. case
.
Based on the description of the case and our understanding of
the world, the death of Baby P. could occur only if at least one of
Tracey Connelly, Steven Barker and Jason Owen caused his death
and all of them allowed it. In addition, it is required that Baby
Peter is allowed to remain in the care of his mother (PMC). The
following equation captures this dependency:
PD =(TC _ SC _ JC)^
(TA ^ SA ^ JA) ^ PMC. (1)
As the value of PMC is affected by factors outside of M1, we
consider it an exogenous variable at this stage, that is, a variable
whose value is set externally. As external observers, our knowl-
edge of the true situation is limited, as not all values of variables
are known to us in advance; if they were, it would have been a
much easier task for the court to determine the appropriate degree
of responsibility of each of the involved parties. However, since
PD = 1 and PMC = 1 (which we know independently from
the value of PD), we can deduce the values of other variables with
some degree of certainty. In particular, PD = 1 implies that
(TC _ SC _ JC) ^ (TA ^ SA ^ JA) = 1, (2)
hence
TC _ SC _ JC = 1 (3)
and
TA ^ SA ^ JA = 1. (4)
From Equation 3 follows that at least one of the variable TC, SC, JC
has the value 1, and from Equation 4 follows that TA, SA, and JA
have the value 1. We model our uncertainty as a pair (K1,Pr1),
as defined in Sec. 3, where K, in our case, represents the possi-
ble contexts, describing situations (assignments of variables) for
Context TC SC JC Pr2
~u11 1 0 0 0.1
~u12 1 1 0 0.15
~u13 0 1 0 0.4
~u14 0 1 1 0.25
~u15 0 0 1 0.05
~u16 1 0 1 0
~u17 1 1 1 0.05
Table 2: Situations and probabilities forM1
M1; since the model stays the same, we omit it from our notation.
The function Pr1 is a probability distribution over the situations.
There exist 7 possible assignments to the variables TC, SC, and
JC that satisfy Equation 3 (this is because the total number of pos-
sible assignments is 23 = 8, and only one of them – the one that
assigns 0 to all three variables – does not satisfy Equation 3). Each
such assignment represents a possible situation (see Sec. 3), or, in
other words, our understanding about what happened. We can as-
sign probabilities to these assignments based on our understanding
of how the world works and the information gathered during the
analysis of the case (for example, that it is less likely for a mother
to cause death of her baby than for the mother’s partner, and that
Baby P. was attached to his mother, indicating that physical abuse
from her side was not very likely). The probabilities capture the
agent’s (in this case, our) knowledge and understanding or could
represent the evidence explicitly; we list these probabilities in Ta-
ble 2; since TA, SA, and JA are assigned to 1 in all situations,
we omit them from the table. While we attempt to match the prob-
abilities with the details known about the case, they are still, of
course, just rough estimates for illustrative purposes. In the future
automated framework, we envision having a separate Bayesian net-
work that represents the evidence and is used to compute posterior
probabilities.
Note that the probabilities sum to 1, and that we assume that the
probability of Tracey Connelly and Jason Owen causing the death
of Baby P. is 0 (corresponding to ~u16), that is, we consider it not
possible that both of them performed actions that caused the death
of Baby P., while Steven Barker did not. We also assign very low
probabilities to the situations ~u15 and ~u17. The situation ~u15 captures
the possibility that Jason Owen alone caused the death of Baby P.;
we consider this unlikely, because the first injuries of Baby P. were
reported before Jason Owen moved into the house. The situation
~u17 captures the possibility that all three adults living in the house
performed actions that caused the death of Baby P.; we consider it
unlikely from our general understanding of how the world works.
The degree of responsibility dr of each of the variables in the
value of PD is computed using Def. 3.1. We note that there is a
counterfactual dependence between the value of TC and the value
of PD in ~u11, corresponding to the situation, where Tracey Con-
nelly alone caused the death of Baby P., and similarly for the value
of SC in ~u13 and the value of JC in ~u15. Hence, in these contexts,
the responsibility of the corresponding variable is 1. In other con-
texts, change in one or more values of other variables is required in
order to create a contingency where such a counterfactual depen-
dence exists (essentially, a change creating the contingency should
satisfy the condition AC2 in Def. 3.1). In contexts, in which two
variables are assigned 1, the size of the minimal change is 1, as
changing the value of one variable to 0 creates a counter-factual
dependence between the value of PD and the value of the other
variable. Hence the responsibility of each of the variables assigned
1 in these contexts is 1/2. Now consider the context ~u17, where we
assume that all three adults living in the house – Tracey Connelly,
Steven Barker, and Jason Owen – caused the death of Baby P. In
this case, we need to change the values of two variables in order
to create the counterfactual dependence, hence the responsibility of
each variable in ~u17 is 1/3.
The degree of blame of each of the three adults living in the
house is the expected degree of responsibility computed accord-
ing to Def. 3.4 as follows, where (K1,Pr1) captures our epistemic
state with respect to the modelM1:
db(K1,Pr1, TC  1, PD) =1⇥ 0.1 + 1/2⇥ (0.15 + 0)+
+ 1/3⇥ 0.05 ⇡ 0.19;
db(K1,Pr1, SC  1, PD) =1⇥ 0.4 + 1/2⇥ (0.15 + 0.25)+
+ 1/3⇥ 0.05 ⇡ 0.62;
db(K1,Pr1, JC  1, PD) =1⇥ 0.15 + 1/2⇥ (0.1 + 0)+
+ 1/3⇥ 0.05 ⇡ 0.19.
(5)
In other words, we deduce that all three adults living in the house-
hold have a non-zero blame in causing the death of Baby P., and
that Steven Barker’s blame is higher than Tracey Connelly’s and
Jason Owen’s (note that both responsibility and blame can range
from 0 to 1, where 0 means not responsible or not to blame).
Now consider the responsibility of Tracey Connelly, Steven Barker,
and Jason Owen in allowing Baby P.’s death. Since the value ofPD
counterfactually depends on Equation 4, we conclude that there is a
counterfactual dependence between the value of PD and the values
of each of the variables TA, SA, and JA. Hence, the only possible
values of these variables are 1, and therefore the degree of blame
coincides with the degree of responsibility, which is 1 for each of
these variables.
To summarize our analysis of the blame of Tracey Connelly,
Steven Barker, and Jason Owen, we conclude that Tracey Con-
nelly’s and Jason Owen’s blame in causing Baby P.’s death is 0.19
each, Steven Barker’s blame is 0.57, and that all three of them are
1-responsible and have a degree of blame 1 (meaning fully respon-
sible and having full blame) for allowing Baby P.’s death. Note that
neither the degrees of responsibility nor the degrees of blame are
expected to sum to 1, in the general case.
5.2 Amore detailedmodel – responsibility and
blame of Dr Al-Zayyat
The next step in refining the model is introducing some addi-
tional variables that affect the value of PMC, and in particular,
the role of Dr Al-Zayyat. This more detailed model, which we de-
noteM2, is depicted in Fig. 3. The additional variables that appear
in this model are listed in Table 3. The dependencies between the
variables in the model M2 and the equations capturing these de-
pendencies are as follows:
1. Baby Peter is left in the care of his mother if he is not ad-
mitted to the hospital by the doctor on duty at the Child De-
velopment Clinic where Baby Peter was seen, the court does
not issue a care order (following the Dec 2006 events), and
Haringey’s Children & Young People Service does not ap-
ply for a care order at the second opportunity (following the
Jul 2007 events). Formally, PMC = ¬DAH ^ ¬CCO1 ^
¬HCA2.
2. The doctor on duty at the Child Development Clinic where
Baby Peter was seen would have admitted Baby Peter to hos-
pital if Dr Al-Zayyat had performed a full investigation of
Baby Peter, or had the doctor on duty been sufficiently ex-
perienced and trained to run Child Development Clinics (in
PD
TC SC JC PMC
DAHCCO1 HCA2
TA SA JA
AZF HRT
HTD HRDAST
PSI PA
Figure 3: A more refined modelM2 for the Baby P. case
.
which case, a full-examination would have been performed
in the case of Baby Peter), and, in addition, either Baby P.
would have found to be severely injured or there was suf-
ficient evidence to him being abused. Formally, DAH =
(AZF _HRT ) ^ (PSI _ PA).
3. HRD refers to the experience of the doctor that is recruited
by the hospital to run the Child Development Clinics, and has
the value 0, indicating that an inexperienced doctor was re-
cruited, based on the evidence in the case regarding the level
of experience of Dr Al-Zayyat. HTD refers to the adequacy
of the training provided. That is,HRT = HTD _HRD.
4. Dr Al-Zayyat might have performed a full-examination of
Baby Peter, had she taken a sufficiently thorough approach
to examinations in the clinic, or if she had received adequate
training, which would have instilled in her the need to ex-
amine babies such as Baby Peter fully, irrespective of their
crankiness. Formally, AZF = (AST _HTD).
Since there is a counterfactual dependence between the value of
PD and the value of PMC (see Equation 5.1), and between the
value of PMC and the value ofDAH in order to compute Dr Al-
Zayyat’s degree of responsibility and blame in the death of Baby P.,
it is enough to analyse the equations that define the value ofDAH
(Baby P. is admitted to the hospital).
While we know that, in fact, Baby P. was already severely in-
jured at the time of his visit to the child’s development clinic, and
that his injuries indicate that he was abused, the materials of the
case suggest that Dr Al-Zayyat was unaware of this fact. The mate-
rials of the case suggest, however, that there was enough data to at
least put Baby P. at the risk of abuse and to ensure he is examined
thoroughly. In other words, while Dr Al-Zayyat did not know the
values of PSI and PA in advance, she should have attributed to
them high enough probability to insist on thorough examination.
In this part of the model, the uncertainty reflects the knowledge
and beliefs of Dr Al-Zayyat. We model her uncertainty as a pair
(K2,Pr2), where K represents the possible contexts for M2, and
the function Pr2 is a probability distribution over the situations,
based on what Dr Al-Zayyat should have known. Based on the
analysis above, the equation for DAH that incorporates all the in-
dependent variables is
DAH = (AST _HTD _HRD) ^ (PSI _ PA). (6)
Variable Meaning Value
DAH Child development clinic doctor admits
Baby Peter to hospital to treat his injuries
0
AZF Dr Al-Zayyat performs a full physical ex-
amination of Baby Peter on 1/8/2007
0
PSI Baby Peter is severely injured on
1/8/2007
1
PA Baby Peter is abused at home 1
HRT The hospital recruited a doctor that was
sufficiently experienced to run the child
development clinic and provided ade-
quate training
0
AST Dr Al-Zayyat is sufficiently thorough in
examining children at the child develop-
ment clinic
0
HRD Experienced doctor recruited for the
child development clinic
0
HTD Adequate training is provided to the doc-
tor recruited for the child development
clinic
0
CCO1 Court makes a care order 0
HCA2 Haringey’s Children & Young People
Service applies for a care order at the sec-
ond opportunity in July 2007
0
Table 3: Additional variables ofM2 and known values
Context PSI PA Pr2
~u21 1 1 0.2
~u22 0 1 0.1
~u23 1 0 0.1
~u24 0 0 0.6
Table 4: The epistemic state of Dr Al-Zayyat forM2
Given that the values of HTD and HRD are 0, and the values
of PSI and PA are 1, there is a clear counterfactual dependence
between the value of AST , that represents the thoroughness of Dr
Al-Zayyat, and the value of DAH , that represents the decision to
admit Baby P. to the hospital (which was not taken). Therefore,
based on the complete knowledge of the situation, Dr Al-Zayyat is
1-responsible (fully responsible) for not admitting Baby P. to the
hospital, and hence for his death. However, when computing the
blame of Dr Al-Zayyat, we consider several possible situations with
respect to the values of PSI and PA, as listed in Table 4. The
probabilities assigned to these situations reflect what Dr Al-Zayyat
should have known (with the caveat that the numbers are, again, for
illustrative purposes only). SinceAST ,HTD, andHRD all have
the value 0, we omit them from the table.
The degree of responsibility dr of the value of AST in the value
of DAH is computed using Def. 3.1. In situations ~u21, ~u22, and ~u23,
there is a counterfactual dependence between the value ofAST and
the value of DAH , based on Equation 5.2, hence the degree of re-
sponsibility is 1 in these situations. In ~u24, the minimal change that
satisfies the condition AC2 in Def. 3.1 is 1 — changing the value
of either PSI or PA to 1 — hence the degree of responsibility of
the value of AST in the value ofDAH in ~u24 is 0.5.
Similarly to the computation in Sec. 5.1, the degree of blame
of the value of AST in the value of DAH is the expected degree
of responsibility computed according to Def. 3.4 as follows, where
(K2,Pr2) captures the epistemic state of Dr Al-Zayyat with respect
Context HTD HRD PSI PA Pr02
~u21 0 0 1 1 0.1
~u22 0 0 0 1 0.2
~u23 0 0 1 0 0.1
~u24 0 0 0 0 0.3
~u25 1 1 0 0 0.1
~u26 0 1 0 0 0.1
~u27 1 0 0 0 0.1
Table 5: The extended epistemic state forM2
to the modelM2:
db(K2,Pr2, AST  0,¬DAH) =
=1⇥ (0.2 + 0.1 + 0.1) + 1/2⇥ 0.6 = 0.7. (7)
In other words, we deduce that Dr Al-Zayyat’s blame in not admit-
ting Baby P. to the hospital, a decision that ultimately led to Baby
P.’s death, is 0.7.
This computation does not take into account the values ofHTD
and HRD, mirrorring the process of public inquiry, where details
of the case are discovered gradually. We now show that the model
can be extended to consider the values of HTD and HRD as
well. Considering all possible situations with respect to the val-
ues ofHTD,HRD, PSI , and PA would have resulted in a table
with 24 = 16 rows. However, the number of situations in which
DAH has the value 0 is significantly lower, as in order for DAH
to have the value 0, either (AST _HTD_HRD) or (PSI_PA)
should be 0, resulting in 7 situations in total, as depicted in Table 5
(again, the probabilities are for illustrative purposes only).
The degree of responsibility of the value of AST in the value
of DAH in ~u25, ~u26, and ~u27 is 0, as there is no contingency that
creates a counterfactual dependence between the value ofAST and
the value of DAH , while still satisfying the condition AC2(b) of
Def. 3.1. The degree of responsibility of of the value of AST in
the value of DAH in situations ~u21, ~u22, ~u23 and ~u24 is the same as
before. Hence, taking the updated probabilities Pr02 into account, it
is easy to see that the updated degree of blame of Dr Al-Zayyat is
db(K2,Pr02, AST  0,¬DAH) =
=1⇥ (0.1 + 0.2 + 0.1) + 1/2⇥ 0.3 = 0.55. (8)
Note that the degree of responsibility stays the same, as it relies on
the values of the variables in the real world.
REMARK 5.1. The decisions of Dr Al-Zayyat can be viewed as
an illustration on the concept of defaults and normality discussed
in Sec. 3.4. The case indicates that she assumed that Baby P. was
neither seriously injured, nor abused at the time he was seen in the
clinic. While there exists a contingency that satisfies the condition
AC2 of Def. 3.1, Dr Al-Zayyat might have ranked this contingency
higher (in other words, being less normal) than the perceived situa-
tion, where Baby P. was assumed to be suffering of a minor illness.
For legal purposes, however, we take into account not what the
agent knows, but what she should have known, and in this case, the
expectation is that Dr Al-Zayyat should have considered a possibil-
ity of a situation in which Baby P. was indeed seriously injured or
abused.
5.3 Further extensions of the model – other
involved parties and timeline
The model can be further extended by considering the actions
of other involved parties, notably, Haringey’s Children & Young
People Service, Haringey Legal Services, the police, and the court.
The variable CCO1 depends on the actions of involved parties, in-
cluding the judge, independent experts, the police, the result of the
investigation of Haringey Legal Services, and the recommendation
of social services. Similarly, the recommendation of Haringey’s
Children & Young People Service depends on the thoroughness of
their examination of Baby P.’s situation; the fact that Steven Barker
was living in the house was discovered only after Baby P.’s death,
indicating a possible lack of thoroughness on their side.
An additional dimension is the timeline, or, more accurately, the
order of events with respect to baby Peter’s well-being. The order
of events can be captured by introducing new, auxiliary variables
that express this order, similarly to the detailed model of the ex-
ample in Section 3 (see Fig. 1 on the right). In that example, the
variables SH (Suzy hits) and BH (Billy hits) captured the order
between the events of both rock throws hitting the bottle. In the
case of Baby P., we can introduce additional variables PMMY Y ,
where MM stands for the month, and Y Y for the year, and the
range of the variables is { Thriving, Neglected, Abused}.
The equation forPD will then incorporate the variablesPMMY Y ,
based on our understanding that baby Peter’s death resulted from
abuse, and that there was no single incident of abuse, but rather
a prolonged series of abuse and neglect over the course of several
months, culminating in baby Peter’s death. In this, more accurate
model, it is possible to introduce the equations capturing the depen-
dence of the values of PMMY Y on the behaviour of the adults
living with baby Peter as well as the official role holders, such as
the GP, social services, the police, and the court. Due to the lack of
space and lack of detailed information about baby P.’s condition at
different times, we defer this model to future work.
Finally, we note that every subsequent refinement we introduce
in the model does not affect the previously computed degrees of
responsibility and blame. This is due to the fact that the model is
highly decomposable: it considers several very different aspects of
blame in Baby P.’s death. By considering each aspect separately,
we do not invalidate the previously computed results.
6. TOWARDSADECISION SUPPORTTOOL
AND EXTENSIONS OF THE ANALYSIS
The process of constructing the causal model and the equations
involves an in-depth analysis of the facts of a case, similar to that
performed in a public inquiry. However, the findings of the analysis
need to be represented in the form of a rigorous model. While
this complicates the analysis somewhat, it also leads to a clearer
and unambiguous specification of the findings, so that these can be
scrutinised subsequently.
Computing the degrees of responsibility and blame can be au-
tomated based on the suggestions we made in this paper. Indeed,
given a model, a set of situations, and the accompanying probabil-
ities, the degrees of responsibility and blame can be computed di-
rectly using the definitions in Sec. 3. However, since the complex-
ity of the exact computation is quite high (see [5]), a straightfor-
ward implementation is likely to lead to prohibitively heavy com-
putations. While better algorithms remain to be developed, we ex-
pect them to use the following observations to improve their effi-
ciency. First of all, models are expected to be quite small by com-
putational standards, even for very complex cases, hence even a
“brute-force” analysis (checking all possible contingencies one af-
ter another) may finish in a reasonable amount of time. Second,
the dependencies between variables are far from random, as they
depict the dependencies between people’s actions and outcomes in
the real world. As we saw in Sec. 5, and we predict that we will see
this situation fairly often, cases can be decomposed in a straight-
forward way, by considering every conjunct of a large causal for-
mula separately, thus making the computation much faster. In legal
reasoning this decomposition corresponds to considering different
parties in the case separately, mirroring the process of inquest and
inquiry. Furthermore, we expect the models constructed from real
legal cases to be amenable to heuristics similar to those used in SAT
solvers [17], which have been shown to dramatically decrease the
complexity of solving instances of the satisfiability problem con-
structed from real industrial cases.
We propose to build an automated framework for computing the
degrees of responsibility and blame, with a user-friendly graphic
user interface (GUI), that will allow the users to input the data em-
ploying an appropriate modelling tool. The causal models will be
constructed automatically by the framework, taking into account
the dependencies between the variables, known values, and the
knowledge or belief of the user about the unknown values. The
framework can then compute the probability of each situation based
on the probabilities of the values of variables, and compute the de-
gree of responsibility and blame of the involved parties based on
this data.
In real-world use of our approach, there is likely to be substan-
tial uncertainty or disagreement between stakeholders concerning
the subjective probability assessment the approach relies on. In-
deed, relying solely on point probabilities is likely to constitute a
barrier to the adoption of this approach. However, it is important to
note that the framework proposed herein does not require the use
of point probabilities, and critical conclusions can still be drawn
with more qualitative or ordinal assessments [26], or working with
thresholds. The formal framework also allows for sensitivity analy-
ses [4], where the impact of different assumptions or estimates can
be assessed. Alternatively, the approach can be extended by mod-
elling an agent’s uncertainty as (K,Kr), where Kr is a credal set:
i.e. a convex set of probability distributions over situations [10].
Recent work has shown how argumentation models can be con-
structed to justify constraints over probability distributions [27]. In
the latter approach, sets of constraints justified by sets of accepted
arguments entail credal sets, thereby enabling the convex sets of
subjective probability distributions employed in models to be scru-
tinised by means of computational models of argumentation.
The framework supports output as quantification of responsibil-
ity and blame, which is useful in complex civil cases, where there is
a need to determine the amounts paid to the claimant by each of the
involved parties (see Sec. 2). In other cases, it might be more use-
ful to compute, whether the degree of responsibility (or the degree
of blame) is above a certain threshold, which can be considered as
a threshold for requiring a response. For example, the court may
decide that only parties with the degree of blame above 0.1 shall
be prosecuted. This might be especially relevant in cases involv-
ing several further removed levels of responsibility, as described in
Sec. 2. An additional attraction of using thresholds instead of ex-
act values is that the computational effort involved in determining
whether the degree of responsibility or blame is above a prede-
fined threshold is much lower (linear in the size of the model) than
the effort required to compute the exact degree of responsibility or
blame.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND ROADMAP
Using a complex legal case we have shown how the proposed
framework can capture complex causal interactions between multi-
ple parties and events, and accommodate probabilistic information
and assumptions. Given these assumptions, the model produces
graded values of responsibility and blame for each party, detailing
how much their actions (or omissions) were responsible for the tar-
get event (in this case the death of Baby P). Using illustrative prob-
ability values, the model assigns each defendant a different degree
of blame for causing Baby P’s death (a relative ordering that ac-
cords with the legal ruling), whereas all three defendants are fully
to blame for allowing the death. The model also assigns degrees of
blame to the numerous different parties who were involved in the
case. One feature of the model is that it does not treat responsibility
or blame as a fixed amount that is distributed amongst each agent;
rather, multiple agents can all have full responsibility or blame for
the same event, as is the case for the three defendants’ responsibil-
ity (and blame) for allowing Baby P. to die. Clearly, this is just a
roadmap, describing a promising direction that can help in structur-
ing the considerations of causes, responsibility and blame in legal
settings.
As mentioned in the introduction, we envisage that this frame-
work, and the detailed causal analysis it permits, is most applica-
ble at the attributive stage of a legal inquiry; for example, when
considering sentencing or compensation, especially when multiple
parties are involved, or when a broader inquiry is required, where a
wider range of individuals or organisations might be held account-
able even if not legally charged. Examples of the latter include
inquiries into child abuse cases, medical negligence, police mis-
conduct, phone-hacking and large-scale riots. In such cases, it is
important to note that the graded assessments of blame and respon-
sibility ought to be considered in conjunction with an assessment
of the other factors that can affect legal responsibility, which is a
broader concept than causal responsibility and blame [30]. In par-
ticular, the analysis of causality illustrated here on the Baby P. case
is inherently jurisdiction-dependent, as the knowledge of actors or
a their psychological of actors might be relevant in some jurisdic-
tions and irrelevant in others. Fortunately, the proposed framework
is flexible enough to accommodate different settings.
The legal profession is conservative when it comes to adopt-
ing new ideas and technology; the recent experience of the use of
Bayes’ rule in the law [6] is especially pertinent when it comes to
the likely challenges to be faced in getting the ideas presented in
this paper accepted. The arguments both in favour of and against
the use of Bayes’ rule apply equally to the proposed formal method
of assigning responsibility. The argument for Bayes’ rule is that,
given some prior and conditional probabilities for hypotheses and
related pieces of evidence (whose values are genuinely open to in-
terpretation), the posterior probabilities can only be rationally com-
puted by Bayes’ rule. In arguing against this many legal profes-
sionals wrongly assume that the probability “updating” – like the
prior probabilities – should be a matter for individual jurors/judges
and there should be no reliance on a “mathematical formula”. The
method we have proposed for assigning responsibility similarly
seeks to “mathematise” part of the legal process that lawyers (wrongly,
in our opinion) feel is the sole domain of a judge’s intuition.
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